This paper provides evidence on managerial motives for raising equity by examining long-run performance and insider trading around canceled and completed seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Insider selling increases prior to completed and canceled SEOs, but declines afterward only for canceled offerings. For completed SEOs, pre-filing insider trading is rel ated to long-run performance after completion. For canceled SEOs, pre-filing insider trading is related to stock performance between filing and cancellation. Finally, changes in insider trading around SEO filing effect the probability of cancellation. Overall, the evidence is consistent with insiders exploiting windows of opportunity by attempting to issue overvalued equity, and cancelling the issue when the market reaction to the announcement eliminates the overvaluation.
Introduction
Recent evidence by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) indicates that, on average, firms completing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) underperform various return benchmarks in the long run by economically significant amounts. The magnitude of this underperformance is striking.
Loughran and Ritter, for example, find that firms completing SEOs have negative abnormal performance of approximately 8% per year for the five years following the offering. One explanation for this underperformance is that insiders knowingly take advantage of transitory "windows of opportunity" by issuing stock when it is substantially overvalued. This explanation for negative post-SEO returns requires that the market is inefficient in that it does not fully capitalize the negative information of the SEO at its announcement.
While negative post-issuance returns are consistent with insiders knowingly selling overvalued equity, it is possible that insiders are unaware of this overvaluation. One way to gain insight into managerial motives for issuing equity, as argued by Lee (1997) and Kahle (2000) , is to examine trading by insiders on their own account. If insiders take advantage of windows of opportunity in selling new shares through a SEO, then they might also sell on their own account in order to profit from their knowledge. In this case, insider trading would be a useful predictor of post-SEO returns. If insider selling increases with pre-offering stock overvaluation, then insider selling should be negatively related to post-SEO returns.
It should be noted that using insider trading to infer managerial motives requires another layer of inefficiency on top of what is required by windows of opportunity. Not only does the market fail to fully capitalize the negative information in the SEO announcement, it also fails to fully capitalize the bad news of insider selling around the SEO. However, previous literature provides evidence that these inefficiencies exist (see Pettit and Venkatesh (1995) , Lakonishok and Lee (1998) , and Kahle (2000) for evidence that insider trading can predict future stock performance).
The evidence on insider trading around SEOs is mixed. Consistent with windows of opportunity, Kahle (2000) finds that the long-run performance after seasoned equity offerings is significantly related to measures of abnormal insider trading. Lee (1997) , in contrast, finds no difference in long-run stock returns for primary SEOs where insiders only sell shares prior to the offering versus SEOs where insiders only buy shares prior to the offering.
We provide further evidence on the windows of opportunity motive for raising capital by examining a related corporate event: the cancellation of a SEO. Previous research on canceled SEOs has focused on the announcement period returns. Mikkelson and Partch (1988) find that firms canceling SEOs between 1974 and 1983 experience mean abnormal returns of approximately -4.0% between the announcement and cancellation of equity issues. They conclude that this is consistent with insiders filing a SEO when shares are overvalued and canceling the offering when the market reaction to the issue announcement eliminates the overvaluation. We replicate Mikkelson and Partch's (1988) analysis with our sample of canceled SEOs between 1984 and 1996, and also find a significantly negative abnormal return between the announcement and cancellation.
We identify and test a number of additional implications of the windows of opportunity hypothesis in the context of cancele d SEOs. If issuers cancel SEOs when shares are no longer overvalued, then longrun post cancellation returns should be non-negative.
1 Building on Lee (1997) and Kahle (2000) , insider trading around the filing and cancellation should provide insights into managerial motives for selling equity. If insiders purposely exploit windows of opportunity by attempting to sell overpriced equity, their selling should be abnormally high prior to the filing of the SEO. Selling should drop after the filing to more normal levels if the return between filing and cancellation corrects this mispricing. Insider trading patterns should also help to predict future returns. Selling prior to the filing should be greater in cases where the firm is more overvalued. Long-run returns, therefore, should be negatively related to pre-filing insider selling. Finally, insider trading patterns should help to predict SEO cancellation. Since insiders only complete offers that remain overpriced after filing (or at least not underpriced), insider selling after the filing should be negatively related to the probability of cancellation. Also, the change in insider selling from the pre-to the post-filing period should be negatively related to the probability of cancellation.
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It should be noted that these predictions arise from the joint hypothesis that insiders attempt to sell new shares to the public that are overpriced, concurrently sell their own overpriced shares privately, and the market does not fully account for these activities. If these predictions are not supported, it could be due to any part of this joint hypothesis being violated.
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The evidence in this paper, however, does support these predictions of the windows of opportunity hypothesis. We find that canceled equity offerings tend to underperform their benchmark portfolios by statistically insignificant amounts. The three-year mean abnormal return for canceled offerings is an insignificant -3.0%. To put the magnitude of this return in perspective, we examine the long-run performance of completed SEOs over the same period. Consistent with previous studies, seasoned offerings exhibit statistically significant underperformance of -14.3% at the three-year horizon.
Evidence on insider trading patterns for canceled SEOs is consistent with insiders attempting to sell overpriced equity. We find that insider selling is high prior to the announcement of an equity issue, but declines between filing and cancellation. This contrasts with insider trading patterns i n completed offerings. In those cases, insider selling is high prior to filing and remains high through the offering period, consistent with insiders believing that their stock remains overvalued at the offering date. Insider trading also helps to predic t subsequent returns. For canceled offerings, insider trading before filing is significantly related to returns between filing and cancellation. For completed offerings, pre-filing trading is significantly related to post-offering returns. Finally, insider trading patterns between filing and offering or cancellation help to predict SEO cancellation. Insider selling after filing and changes in insider selling around filing have a significantly negative effect on the probability that a SEO is canceled.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The data and empirical methods are described in section 2. Evidence on the long run performance and insider trading around the filing of completed and canceled offerings is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents a summary of the paper's findings.
Data and Methodology

Sample Selection
The sample consists of canceled and completed SEOs between 1984 and 1996 that are recorded in Security Data Company's New Issue Database. In order to remain in the final sample, a firm must satisfy the following criteria:
1. The common stock is listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ and has security returns available from the monthly CRSP tape. 2. The security is not a shelf registration, unit offering, or rights offering. 3. The security is not a real estate investment trust, ADR, or closed-end mutual fund. 4. The firm has a non-negative book equity value available from COMPUSTAT for the fiscal year end before the completion or cancellation of their equity offering.
These filters are similar to those employed by Kahle (2000) and Lee (1997) for completed seasoned offerings and Dunbar (1998 Dunbar ( , 2000 for canceled initial public offerings, and result in a final sample of 174 canceled and 3092 completed SEOs. Table 1 reports the frequency distribution of the canceled and completed offerings of common stock in each year from 1984 to 1996. The number of canceled offers increases in the 1990s, concurrent with an increase in the total number of offers. The ratio of canceled to completed offers, however, does not appear to exhibit any trend over time.
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Our sample includes firms that register pure primary, pure secondary, and combinations of both primary and secondary shares. Since Cla rke, Dunbar, and Kahle (2000) provide evidence that firms issuing pure secondary shares perform differently than firms issuing primary shares, we repeat our 3 For example, insiders may be attempting to sell overpriced equity but the market fully accounts for this opportunism. 4 We also examine the number of canceled offers that subsequently obtain equity financing. Of our 174 sample firms, 18 obtain financing within one year after the canceled offering, and an additional 25 obtain it within five years after the cancellation date. The total fraction of returning issuers is much higher than found by Dunbar (1998) for canceled IPOs, suggesting that SEO cancellations are less costly for both issuers and their investment banks.
analysis after deleting 33 canceled issues and 404 completed issues of only secondary shares. The results are qualitatively unaffected.
Matching Portfolios and Long-run Abnormal Returns
In order to compute long-run abnormal returns, we follow the procedure in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) and construct 50 size and market-to-book referenc e portfolios. Market capitalization is calculated as shares outstanding times closing price in the month of issue or cancellation, and is converted into 1996 purchasing power dollars using the U.S. consumer price index (CPI). The market-to-book ratio for completed SEOs is calculated as the market value of equity at issue divided by book value of equity after the offer, where book value after the offer is defined as book value in the fiscal year prior to the offer plus the number of primary shares issued times offer price. For a canceled offering, the market-to-book ratio is calculated by dividing the market value of equity on the cancellation date by the book equity value for the most recent fiscal year before the cancellation.
Each month, all eligible NYSE/AMEX firms are sorted into deciles according to their market value of equity. Within each size decile, firms are further sorted into quintiles according to their market-to-book ratio. Nasdaq firms are then placed into the appropriate portfolio. Beginning in the next month, the oneyear buy-and-hold return is calculated for each firm in a given portfolio. The portfolio is rebalanced at the end of each year, and multi-year returns are calculated by compounding average annual returns over time. The reference portfolio return is the equally-weighted average of all annual returns in a given portfolio. Excess performance is defined as the difference between the annual return to the sample firm and the return to the appropriately matched size and market-to-book reference portfolio. Statistical inference is based on a bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) find that this statistical method yields well-specified test-statistics in random samples. 
Insider Trading Data
Insider trading data is obtained from the monthly Ownership Reporting System tapes compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 6 The SEC defines an insider as an executive, officer, or director, controlling person of the firm, or any principal shareholder who owns more than ten percent of total common stock outstanding. Previous research, however, indicates that trades by principal shareholders who are not officers or directors do not convey much information (Seyhun, 1986) . Consequently, we examine trades by company executives, officers, directors, and controlling persons. Following Seyhun (1986), we delete all duplicate, amended, and inconsistent transactions, and any transactions involving less than 100 shares.
We focus on measures of abnormal insider trading. In some firms, insiders trade on a regular basis, whereas in others, any trading is unusual. To account for this, we consider two definitions abnormal insider trading. First, abnormal insider trading is defined as actual trading minus expected trading, where trading refers to sales or purchases. Expected trading is the mean trading of that firm in the 36-month period beginning 48 months prior to the announcement of a new issue and ending 13 months prior to the announcement. Second, standardized abnormal insider trading is calculated as actual trading minus expected trading, divided by the standard deviation of expected trading (see Seyhun, 1990 ). Both measures abstract from differences in the mean value of sales (or purchases) that can be attributed to factors other than the new issue. The standardization further minimizes potential heteroscedasticity problems. 7 Finally, both measures of insider trading can be defined in terms of either the number of trades or the number of shares (volume) traded. While we consider all possibilities, we only report the 5 For details on this methodology see Section III.B on pages 173-175 in Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) . 6 Prior to January 10, 1994, National Archives distributed this data. Insider transactions reported from January 11, 1994 until late 1997 were distributed by Disclosure, Inc. Since the Disclosure data came without CUSIP numbers, we attached CUSIP numbers based on CRSP company names. We thank Inmoo Lee for a list of companies that did not match based on CRSP names, but for which CUSIPs were available. 7 Standardization also reduces the sample size since firms that do not trade during the historical period have standard deviation of 0, for which standardized insider trading is undefined. We focus on the unstandardized measure to maximize the sample size.
unstandardized measure of abnormal insider trading using the number of trades. Results using other insider trading measures are qualitatively similar. 
Results
Sample Characteristics
Panel A of Table 2 replicates previous work by Mikkelson and Partch (1988) on the wealth effects of completed and canceled SEOs. Excess return is defined as the difference between the return from buying and holding the SEO and the return from buying and holding the value-weighted market index for the same period.
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The cancellation date is the earliest of the announcement date from The Wall Street
Journal and Dow Jones News Retrieval, or the cancellation filing date from Lexis/Nexis and SDC.
Our announcement period results are consistent with Mikkelson and Partch. Both completed and canceled offerings exhibit positive and significant excess returns prior to the announcement of the offering and negative and significant excess returns at the announcement date. However, cancellations follow significantly negative abnormal returns of -12.7% and are met with a positive stock price reaction of 1.3%. In contrast, completed equity offerings follow insignificant abnormal returns, and the news of the issuance is met with a negative stock price reaction.
In Panel B of Table 2 we provide summary statistics on market capitalization, market-to-book equity ratios, and offering size for completed and canceled offerings. Firms canceling offers are significantly smaller than firms completing offers. The mean (median) market capitalization of firms canceling an offer is $310.0 ($118.2) million dollars, compared to $719.6 ($231.5) for firms completing offers.
Consistent with the smaller market capitalization, canceled offers also have a smaller offering size. Here, offering size for completed (canceled) offerings is measured as shares offered (registered) times the 8 We also consider net selling, defined as selling less buying. Results using net selling, rather than buying and selling separately, are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 9 Returns are also calculated using the equally-weighted market index, the market model, and the Scholes-Williams procedure. The level and significance o f excess returns are not sensitive to the methods used.
offering price (average the high and low filing price). The mean offering size is $44.6 million for canceled offers and $70.9 million for completed offers.
The mean (median) market-to-book equity ratios for the canceled and completed samples are 3.59 (2.72) and 2.96 (2.29), respectively. The differences are significant using both parametric and nonparametric tests. Our market-to-book values are higher than those found in earlier studies, such as Lee (1996) . However, our sample covers a more recent time period. When we split our sample into issues filed in the 1990s versus issues filed in the 1980s, the market to book ratio of the more recent issues is significantly higher than that of the early issues. Further, our sample contains smaller firms then Lee.
This is consistent with our sample containing a higher proportion of small, high growth companies such as Internet and biotech stocks.
Long-run Performance of Completed and Canceled SEOs
To provide evidence on the managerial motives for raising equity capital, we examine the differences in the long-run performance of completed and canceled SEOs in Panel C of Table 2 . For completed SEOs, the windows of opportunity hypothesis predicts negative post-offering abnormal returns.
Consistent with prior studies (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; and Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995) we find that completed SEOs underperform their benchmarks by economically significant amounts. After three years, completed offers have a significant -14.3% abnormal return. Exclusion of pure secondary offers results in a significant three-year abnormal return of -17.7%.
If insiders cancel offerings if they feel the stock is no longer overvalued following the negative market reaction, long-run abnormal returns following cancellation should be non-negative. We find that after three years, the canceled offers have an insignificant -3.0% mean abnormal return. The lack of significance is consistent with insiders canceling offers when they are no longer overvalued. It should be noted, however, that the difference between mean returns for completed and canceled offerings is not significant.
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Also, the median three-year abnormal return following cancellation is significantly negative. 11 This potentially suggests that our tests for canceled SEOs are simply not powerful enough to reject windows of opportunity.
Insider Trading in Completed and Canceled SEOs
If insiders are attempting to exploit windows of opportunity by purposely selling overvalued equity, then measures of insider selling (buying) should be positive (negative) prior the filin g of both completed
and canceled SEOs. Measures of abnormal selling (buying) should remain high (low) up to the offering for successful SEOs since insiders proceed with offerings that remain overvalued. For canceled SEOs, measures of abnormal insider selling (buying) should decrease (increase) after filing as insiders cancel
SEOs that are no longer overvalued.
In Panels A and B of Table 3 we examine insider trading around the canceled and completed SEO samples, respectively. The first two columns report the mean number of sales and purchases per firm.
The last two report abnormal sales and purchases, defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases). Expected sales (purchases) is the mean sales (purchases) in the 36 month period beginning 48 months prior to the announcement and ending 13 months prior to the announcement.
Consistent with Kahle (2000) and Karpoff and Lee (1991) , insider selling increases and purchasing decreases in the months leading up to the filing of both completed and canceled SEOs. Sales are abnormally high for several quarters prior to the filing, while purchases are significantly lower than expected in the quarter prior to filing. 10 We also match each canceled offering to a completed offering of similar size and market-to-book ratio. Again, no significant differences are found in the long-run abnormal performance. 11 Mean returns better reflect realizable investment performance than median returns, however, and are therefore more appropriate measures of mispricing. To gain more insight into the source of the negative median returns, we examine delistings within three years of the SEO cancellation due to bankruptcy, liquidation or failure to meeting exchange listing requirements. Ignoring firms that delist, the mean three-year post-cancellation abnormal return is 11.46% (p=0.444) and the median return is an insignificant -25.66% (p=0.112). Omitting delisted firms does not impact the significance of mean and median abnormal returns for successful SEOs. The larger impact of delistings for cancelled offerings suggests that the inability to raise capital impacts many firms' ability to survive. As discussed in the conclusion, we believe that future work should consider the relative importance of alternative motivations for raising capital, such as the need for capital, in addition to windows of opportunity.
After filing the SEO, trading differs between completed and canceled offers, consistent with windows of opportunity. For completed offers, insider selling remains high in the quarters following the filing relative to the historic averages. For canceled SEOs, in contrast, sales are not significantly higher than normal after filing.
Insider Trading and Long-run Performance of Completed and Canceled SEOs
While the evidence on insider trading patterns is consistent with windows of opportunity, we cannot rule out the possibility that insider are simply mechanically rebalancing their portfolios after significant stock price runups. Consequently, we attempt to determine whether insider trading is a predictor of longrun abnormal stock performance after controlling for the stock price runup and other factors. Selling before filing should be greater in cases where the firm is more overvalued. Thus, windows of opportunity would predict that post-filing stock returns are negatively (positively) related to pre-filing insider selling (buying).
The theory is silent as to the horizon over which post-filing returns are measured. We consider two alternatives. First, we measure returns over the three years beginning on the cancellation date for canceled SEOs and the offering date for successful SEOs. 12 Second, we measure returns over the period from filing to either cancellation or completion of the offering. Table 4 examines the relation between long-run post-cancellation and post-offering performance and insider trading. Buy-and-hold returns are regressed on, among other things, abnormal insider sales and purchases. 13 Control variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, and stock price runup prior to the offer. In regressions (1) and (2) we examine the relation between long-run returns and insider trading for successful offerings, replicating Kahle (2000) and Lee (1997) . Since insiders might be trading based on their firm's expected performance, or the firm's performance relative to the market or other firms, we 12 Results are similar using a one-or five-year horizon. 13 As noted previously abnormal insider selling (purchasing) is defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases). Expected sales (purchases) is the mean sales (purchases) of that firm in the 36 month period beginning 48 months prior to the announcement of a new issue and ending 13 months prior to the announcement. This result is robust to the use of other definitions of abnormal insider trading, however.
consider two dependent variables. In regression (1) the dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the issuer's three-year buy-and-hold return. In regression (2), the dependent variable is the abnormal buy-and-hold return, defined as the sample firm's buy-and-hold return minus the matching portfolio's buy-and-hold return. In both regressions, stock returns are positively related to firm size and negatively related to prior stock price runup and the market-to-book ratio. The returns are also significantly negatively related to abnormal insider selling. This evidence supports the view that insiders exploit windows of opportunity when issuing equity, consistent with Kahle (2000) .
Regressions (3) and (4) of Table 4 examine the relation between long-run returns and insider trading for canceled offerings. In regression (3) the dependent variable is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the issuer's three-year post-cancellation buy-and-hold return, as in regression (1). In regression (4), the dependent variable is the abnormal buy-and-hold return, as in regression (2). The control variables are not significant in either regression. It should be noted, however, that collinearity might be an issue in this smaller sample (the R 2 s in regressions (3) and (4), for example, are similar to those in regressions (1) and (2)). In contrast to the completed sample, abnormal insider buying and selling prior to filing are unrelated to post-cancellation abnormal returns.
In Table 5 we examine the relation between insider trading and stock performance from filing to cancellation or offering. Since the length of this interval varies across firms, we measure abnormal performance relative to a size and market-to-book control firm as in Barber and Lyon (1996) . In regression (1) of Table 5 , the dependent variable is the excess return between filing and offering for completed SEOs. Independent variables include measures of pre-filing insider buying and selling. As in Table 4 , control variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, and stock price runup prior to the offer.
Excess returns are positively related to firm size and the market-to-book ratio. Measures of abnormal insider selling and buying are not significant. In regression (2) of Table 5 , the dependent variable is the excess return between filing and cancellation for canceled SEOs. Returns are significantly positively related to firm size. Abnormal insider selling is negatively related to post filing returns, although not significantly. Abnormal insider buying is significantly positively related to post-filing returns.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 is consistent with the windows of opportunity motive for raising capital. For completed offerings, pre-filing insider trading does not help to predict returns between filing and offering but does help to predict post-offering returns. This is consistent with prior evidence that overpricing at the time of filing is not reversed until after the offering is completed. For canceled offerings, pre-filing insider trading helps to predict returns between filing and cancellation but does not predict returns post-cancellation. Again, this is consistent with prior evidence that, on average, overpricing at the time of filing is fully eliminated by the time the offering is canceled. This evidence is also consistent with insider trading patterns documented in Table 3 . For completed SEOs, selling remains high post-filing as insiders do not believe that overvaluation has been reversed. For canceled SEOs, selling reverts to normal levels after filing, as insiders believe that the overvaluation has been eliminated.
The Determinants of SEO Cancellation
Our final tests examine the determinants of SEO cancellation. The windows of opportunity story predicts that insiders cancel SEOs when the overvaluation existing at the time of filing is eliminated before the shares can be offered. If insiders are trading personally in an attempt to exploit mispricing, selling (buying) should be abnormally positive (negative) before the filing and drop to more normal levels afterward. For completed SEOs, overvaluation is not eliminated so net selling should remain abnormally positive after the filing. Empirically, we should observe a relation between insider trading around filing and the probability of cancellation. Specifically, insider selling (buying) after the filing should be negatively (positively) related to the probability of cancellation. Also, the change in insider selling (buying) should be negatively (positively) related to the probability of cancellation.
14 To test these predictions, we estimate a logit regression including both completed and canceled SEOs.
A dummy variable, taking on value 1 if the offering is canceled and 0 otherwise, is regressed on, among other things, measures of abnormal insider purchases and sales after the filing and changes in insider 14 Abnormal insider selling and buying before filing should be similar for both completed and canceled offerings and, therefore, are not used in the logit regressions.
purchases and sales around the filing. Control variables include firm size, the firm's market-to-book ratio, the abnormal return over the sixty days leading up to the announcement of the SEO, the abnormal stock return at announcement, and the abnormal return from announcement to the offering or cancellation.
The logit regression estimates are reported in Table 6 . SEOs by smaller issuers having larger market to book ratios are more likely to be canceled, consistent with evidence by Dunbar (1998) for IPOs. The abnormal return at announcement and the abnormal return from filing to cancellation/offering have a negative effect on the probability of cancellation. The more negative the market response, the more likely a SEO will be canceled, consistent with the windows of opportunity story.
In regression (1), we include abnormal insider purchases and sales in the quarter after filing.
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Abnormal insider purchases is unrelated to the probability of cancellation but abnormal insider sales is significantly negatively related to the probability of cancellation. This is consistent with windows of opportunity. If the stock remains overvalued and insider selling is high, the offering is less likely to be canceled. In regression (2) we include the difference between sales (purchases) in the quarter after the filing and sales (purchases) in the quarter prior to the filing in the logit regression. Addition of these variables does not affect the coefficients on other control variables from regression (1). We find a negative and significant coefficient on the change in insider selling. The coefficient on the change in insider buying is positive but not significant.
In sum, the evidence in Table 6 is consistent with the windows of opportunity motivation for raising equity capital. Insiders are more likely to cancel a SEO in cases where net selling has declined to more normal levels after the filing. When insiders no longer believe their firm is overvalued, they revise their personal trades and cancel their SEO.
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the managerial motives for raising equity capital by examining the decision to cancel an equity offering. As argued by Loughran and Ritter (1995) , insiders may attempt to issue equity to take advantage of transitory windows of opportunity when their stock is overpriced. Given this motivation, insiders should cancel a SEO if the market reaction to the announcement of the offering is sufficiently negative to eliminate the overpricing.
We find that completed and canceled offerings exhibit similar abnormal stock performance leading up to and around their filing. The abnormal performance after filing differs for the two groups, however.
Completed SEOs exhibit no significant abnormal performance between the filing and offering dates, whereas canceled SEOs experience a significant abnormal performance of approximately -13% between the filing and cancellation dates. The long run-performance after cancellation is not significant.
To provide greater insight into managerial motives for raising capital we examine insider trading around completed and canceled SEOs. Insider selling increases prior to both completed and canceled offers, but remains high after the filing for only the completed sample. Pre-filing insider trading is related to post-offering returns for completed offerings. For canceled offers, pre-filing insider trading is related to returns between filing and cancellation. This is consistent with insiders increasing (decreasing) their selling (buying) in cases where their company stock is move overvalued. Finally, insider selling after the SEO filing and changes to insider selling from before to after filing are negatively related to the probability of cancellation. When insiders no longer believe their firm is overvalued, they revise their personal trades and cancel their SEO. Overall, our evidence on insider trading is consistent with insiders attempting to exploit windows of opportunity by attempting to issue equity when it is overvalued. It should be noted that this evidence suggests the market is inefficient in that it fails to fully capitalize the negative information in the announcement of the SEO and the contemporaneous insider trading.
Our evidence is consistent with insiders attempting to sell overpriced equity. However, other factors such as capital requirements, the desire to increase analyst coverage, and the desire to improve market liquidity may also play important roles in a firm's decision to attempt to raise capital then subsequently proceed or cancel. We leave exploration of the relative importance of these factors and windows of opportunity to future research. Excess announcement period returns are calculated as the difference between the return from buying and holding a sample firm's stock and the return from buying and holding the CRSP value-weighted market index. FD is the filing date, OD is the outcome date for completed offerings, and WD is the cancellation date for canceled offerings. Market capitalization is the number of shares outstanding times the closing price in the cancellation or offering month, adjusted to 1996 dollars. The market-to-book ratio for completed SEOs is calculated as the market value of equity at issue divided by book value of equity after the offer. For a canceled offering, the market-to-book ratio is calculated by dividing the market value of equity on the cancellation date by the book equity value for the most recent fiscal year before the cancellation.
Offering size is calculated by multiplying the number of shares offered (registered) by the offering price (average filing price), adjusted to 1996 dollars. Buy-and-hold post-offering or cancellation abnormal returns are measured relative to a size and market-to-book matched portfolio. *** , ** , and * indicate significance of individual mean (median) statistics at the one, five and ten-percent level using a bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-test (signed rank text). This table reports the average number of sales and the number of purchases per firm per quarter in the four quarters before and the four quarters after the filing date of a seasoned equity offering for our sample of canceled and completed SEOs. Abnormal sales (purchases) are defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in the given quarter. Expected sales (purchases) is the mean quarterly sales (purchases) of that firm in the 36 month period beginning 48 months prior to the anno uncement of a new issue and ending 13 months prior to the announcement. *, **, and *** indicate that actual trading is significantly different from expected trading at the ten-, five-, and one-percent level, respectively. This table examines the relation between long-run performance and insider trading for the sample of canceled and completed security issues. The dependent variables are LBHR (log (1 + the issuer's three-year buy-and-hold return)) and LAR (sample firm's LBHR minus matching portfolio's LBHR).
Returns are calculated starting from the day the offering is either completed or cancelled. The excess return prior to the filing is defined as the difference between the return from buying and holding the SEO firm stock and the return from buying and holding the value-weighted market index over the same period. Market capitalization is defined as shares outstanding times closing price in the month of issue or cancellation, adjusted to 1996 dollars. The market-to-book ratio for completed SEOs is calculated as the market value of equity at issue divided by book value of equity after the offer. For a canceled offering, the market-to-book ratio is calculated by dividing the market value of equity on the cancellation date by the book equity value for the most recent fiscal year before the cancellation. Abnormal insider sales (purchases) are defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in the quarter before the issue date or cancellation date. Expected sales (purchases) is the mean sales (purchases) of that firm in the 36 month period beginning 48 months prior to the announcement of a new issue and ending 13 months prior to the announcement. The first number in each cell is the parameter coefficient; the number in parentheses is the p-value, calculated using White's heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance estimator. This table examines the relation between stock performance and insider trading for the sample of canceled and completed security issues. The dependent variable is the excess return between the filing date and either the completion or cancellation date. Market capitalization is defined as shares outstanding times closing price in the month of issue or cancellation, adjusted to 1996 dollars. The market-to-book ratio for completed SEOs is calculated as the market value of equity at issue divided by book value of equity after the offer. For a canceled offering, the market-to-book ratio is calculated by dividing the market value of equity on the cancellation date by the book equity value for the most recent fiscal year before the cancellation. Excess returns are defined as the difference between the return from buying and holding the SEO and the return from buying and holding the value-weighted market index for the same period. Abnormal insider sales (purchases) are defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in the quarter before the issue date or cancellation date. Expected sales (purchases) is the mean sales (purchases) of that firm in the 36 month period beginning 48 months prior to the announcement of a new issue and ending 13 months prior to the announcement. The first number in each cell is the parameter coefficient; the number in parentheses is the p-value, calculated using White's heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance estimator. 
Table 6 Determinants of SEO Cancellation
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the offering is canceled and 0 otherwise. Market capitalization is defined as shares outstanding times closing price in the month of issue or cancellation, adjusted to 1996 dollars. The market-to-book ratio for completed SEOs is calculated as the market value of equity at issue divided by book value of equity after the offer. For a canceled offering, the market-to-book ratio is calcula ted by dividing the market value of equity on the cancellation date by the book equity value for the most recent fiscal year before the cancellation. Excess returns are defined as the difference between the return from buying and holding the SEO and the return from buying and holding the value-weighted market index for the same period. Abnormal insider sales (purchases) are defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in the quarter after filing. Change in insider sales (purchases) is defined as insider sales (purchases) the quarter after the filing minus insider sales (purchases) the quarter before the filing. The first number in each cell is the parameter coefficient estimate; the number in parentheses is the maximum likelihood p-value.
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